

Message Text

PAGE 01 NEW DE 00182 01 OF 02 050357Z

66

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 OMB-01 EUR-25 AID-20 DRC-01 /137 W

----- 023481

R 041545Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8833

INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY

AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

AMCONSUL MADRAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 0182

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, IN

SUBJ: 1973 INDIAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REVIEW

SUMMARY: AFTER WHAT SEEMED TO BE TWO TRIUMPHAL YEARS, THE PRIME MINISTER FACED GROWING PROBLEMS AND DECLINING POPULARITY DURING 1973. SURGING INFLATION UNDERMINED THE MASSIVE POPULAR SUPPORT SHE HAD ENJOYED. THROUGH THE SUMMER, HER GOVERNMENT DEVOTED ITS ENERGIES TO DROUGHT RELIEF AND SHE WAS KEPT BUSY SUSTAINING HER SUPPORTERS IN THE STATE CAPITALS. SHE WISELY YIELDED TO LOCAL PRESSURE WHEN UNAVOIDABLE. GRANTED SOME RESPITE BY THE GOOD 1973 MONSOON, SHE MOVED TO STILL DISSENT WITHIN THE CONGRESS, FIND USEFUL FRIENDS ON THE RIGHT AND LEFT, AND SETTLE AFFAIRS IN THE STATES. SHE CAN NOW LOOK FORWARD WITH REASONABLE CONFIDENCE TO THE 1974 POLLS IN TWO STATES AND THE AUGUST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THERE ARE NOW CONVINCING INDICATIONS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL MOVE

DECISIVELY ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT--TO CURB INFLATION, MITIGATE SCARCITY, AND STIMULATE PRODUCTION. CONTINUED FAILURE EVEN TO BEGIN DELIVERING THE GOODS PROMISED IN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 NEW DE 00182 01 OF 02 050357Z

1971 AND 1972 MAY AGAIN ERODE HER LATE 1973 POLITICAL RECOVERY. IF SHE CONTINUES TO AVOID CRISES, MRS. GANDHI AND INDIA MAY CONTINUE TO DRIFT ALONG FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS. MRS. GANDHI SEES FOREIGN RELATIONS IN TERMS OF

HER OWN POWER IN INDIA. A THREAT TO HER POLITICAL POSITION COULD WELL LEAD HER TO TURN ON ANY FOREIGN STATE SHE MAY BELIEVE HAS AN INTEREST--HOWEVER WRONGLY IMAGINED--IN THE SUCCESS OF AN OPPONENT. INDIA SEEMS LIKELY, THEREFORE, TO CONTINUE TO BE A FRAGILE PARTNER IN FRIENDSHIP AND TO REMAIN A POLITICALLY WEAK STATE EVEN THOUGH IT MAY MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY BE THE STRONGEST IN THE REGION. END SUMMARY.

1. IN 1973 THE PRIME MINISTER'S RUN OF POLITICAL GOOD FORTUNE--EMBRACING TWO NATIONAL ELECTION VICTORIES, THE HUMBLING OF PAKISTAN AND THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH, AND THE TEMPORARY ACHIEVEMENT OF FOODGRAIN "SELF-SUFFICIENCY"--FINALLY BROKE. DESPITE THE SCANTY 1972 MONSOON, SHE AND HER PARTY PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO A STATE TAKEOVER OF THE WHOLESALE TRADE IN WHEAT AND RICE. SEEKING TO BREAK THE STATE BOSSES AND THE DOMINANT LOCAL CASTES AND FACTIONS, SHE HAD INSTALLED CHIEF MINISTERS OF HER CHOOSING IN MANY STATES IN 1972. THESE RADICAL STEPS WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY CONGRESS LEFTISTS AND THE PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (CPI). THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIVE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S WILL WERE NOT EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO ENABLE THESE POLICIES TO WORK A BASIC TRANSFORMATION IN INDIAN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS.

2. UNDISCIPLINED DEFICIT FINANCING AND POOR HARVESTS SENT WHOLESALE FOODGRAIN PRICES SKYROCKETING 22 PERCENT BETWEEN MARCH AND DECEMBER. AS WESTERN INDIA ENDURED ITS THIRD DROUGHT YEAR, GOVERNMENT-HELD FOODGRAIN STOCKS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO URBAN CONSUMERS AND RURAL WORKERS ENGAGED IN DROUGHT-RELIEF PROJECTS. MANY WHEAT FARMERS, RELUCTANT TO SELL GRAIN TO THE GOVERNMENT AT WHAT THEY CONSIDERED UNREMUNERATIVE PRICES, SOLD MUCH OF IT TO PRIVATE TRADERS AT HIGHER PRICES. AS ELECTRIC POWER CUTS AFFLICTED SEVERAL STATES, IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION SUFFERED. PRICES OF CONSUMER NECESSITIES AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 NEW DE 00182 01 OF 02 050357Z

MANUFACTURED GOODS ROSE; SCARCITY SPREAD. THE GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO IMPORT GRAIN AT SUDDENLY INFLATED WORLD PRICES. THE WHEAT TRADE TAKEOVER FAILED.

3. POOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE WAS MATCHED BY POPULAR DISCONTENT AND POLITICAL DISSIDENCE. SOME SECTIONS OF URBAN MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASSES, LED BY THE CPI, THE JANA SANGH AND THE SHIV SENA, ENGAGED IN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. SALARIED GOVERNMENT CLERKS, DOCTORS, AND POWER ENGINEERS ORGANIZED STRIKES, "SLOW-DOWNS", AND OCCASIONAL SABOTAGE. MAN-DAYS LOST TO STRIKES STOOD AT 11.2 MILLION ON SEPTEMBER 1, AND

MAY WELL EQUAL THE HIGH 1972 LEVEL (20.5 MILLION). INEVITABLY, SOME DEMONSTRATIONS TURNED VIOLENT. PERHAPS THE MOST DISTURBING DEVELOPMENT WAS THE BLOODY BUT QUICKLY QUELLED JUNE "REVOLT" OF CERTAIN POLICE UNITS IN UTTAR PRADESH. TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR, ISOLATED INSTANCES OF STUDENT, COMMUNAL AND CASTE VIOLENCE WERE AGAIN REPORTED FROM SEVERAL STATES. 1974 OPENED WITH BANDH AND HECKLING OF MRS. GANDHI IN MAHARASHTRA (SEPTELS). THERE ARE NO EASILY DEFINABLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THESE OUTBREAKS OTHER THAN GENERAL DISSATISFACTION, DISILLUSIONMENT WITH GOVERNMENT, AND SHEER FRUSTRATION.

4. DISGRUNTLED AND DISPLACED LOCAL POLITICIANS, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE POPULAR MOOD AND OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE CONGRESS ORGANIZATION, MOVED IN EARLY 1973 TO DISLODGE THE PRIME MINISTER'S LOYAL BUT INEFFECTIVE NOMINEES IN THE STATE CAPITALS. CHIEF MINISTER NARASIMHA RAO OF ANDHRA PRADESH WENT FIRST. VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN FAVOR OF BIFURCATION OF THE STATE TARNISHED MRS. GANDHI'S IMAGE IN THAT STATE, WHERE SHE HAD WON A MASSIVE VICTORY IN 1972. LEFTIST NANDINI SATPATHY IN ORISSA, HAVING HELD ON TO POWER BY ENCOURAGING OPPOSITION LEGISLATORS TO DEFECT, FELL TO MASSIVE COUNTER-DEFECTION. KAMLAPATHI TRIPATHI OF UTTAR PRADESH, DESPITE HIS LOCAL POWER BASE, COULD NOT SURVIVE THE ADMINISTRATIVE BANKRUPTCY REVEALED BY THE POLICE "REVOLT". IN EACH OF THESE STATES, SUPPOSEDLY APOLITICAL "PRESIDENT'S RULE" FROM NEW DELHI WAS INVOKED. IN JUNE, KEDAR PANDE OF BIHAR AND GHANSHYAM OZA OF GUJARAT FELL. PANDE WAS REPLACED BY A WEAK NOMINEE OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 NEW DE 00182 01 OF 02 050357Z

RAILWAYS MINISTER L.N. MISHRA. OZA SUCCUMBED TO THE WELL-TIMED MANEUVERS OF CHIMANBHAI PATEL, A LOCAL POWER. THE GOVERNMENT WAS RELUCTANT TO SCHEDULE BY-ELECTIONS AND LOST FOUR CONTESTS FOR THE LOK SABHA. DURING THE SUMMER, THE PRIME MINISTER DID SUCCEED IN DEFENDING A FEW OF HER NOMINEES AND WAS NEVER THREATENED BY A CREDIBLE RIVAL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. BY MID-AUGUST, THE PRESS AND ARTICULATE U RANTIES# AGREED THAT 1973 HAD BEEN "THE WORST YEAR SINCE INDEPENDENCE."

5. THE PRIME MINISTER BIDED HER TIME AND AWAITED THE MONSOON, WHICH DID NOT FAIL HER. THE RAINS PROMISED SUFFICIENT GRAIN, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCARCITY AND POPULAR DISCONTENT LESSENED. AT THE FALL MEETING OF THE ALL-INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE, THE PRIME MINISTER REASSERTED HER AUTHORITY WITHIN THE CONGRESS AND TRIMMED CONGRESS COMMITMENTS TO FIT ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REALITY. THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER DINESH SINGH WAS SUSPENDED WITHOUT WARNING. THE

SCHOCK WAVES WERE FELT BY LEFTIST AND BY THE MASS OF CENTRIST/CONSERVATIVE CONGRESSMEN, ALL GIVEN TO SEMI-PUBLIC GRUMBLING. THUS WHEN THE CONGRESS LEADERSHIP PROPOSED POSTPONEMENT AND LOCAL OPTION ON THE STATE TAKEOVER OF THE RICE TRADE, DISSIDENT VOICES WERE FEEBLE AND FEW. WITH THE DEATH OF EX-CPI MINISTER MOHAN KUMARAMANGALAM IN MAY, THE CONGRESS RADICALS HAD ALREADY LOST THEIR BRIGHTEST, MOST ELOQUENT, AND BEST-CONNECTED SPOKESMAN. MRS. GANDHI'S RECENT REMARKS, INTERPRETED BY SOME AS LEANING TOWARD A PRAGMATIC, INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTION-ORIENTED APPROACH, WITHOUT SURPRISE NATIONALIZATION, WERE COUPLED WITH DIRECT AND VEILED CRITICISM OF SLOGAN-MONGERING CONGRESS RADICALS. THESE PORTENTS WERE TAKEN BY SOME AS PRESAGING A RETURN TO PRODUCTION-ORIENTED PRAGMATISM, BUT SKEPTICISM REMAINED THE RULE.

NOTE BY OCT: #AS RECEIVED.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 NEW DE 00182 02 OF 02 050425Z

66

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 OMB-01 EUR-25 AID-20 DRC-01 /137 W

----- 023627

R 041545Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8834

INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY

AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

AMCONSUL MADRAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 NEW DELHI 0182

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, IN

SUBJ: 1973 INDIAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REVIEW

6. THE PRIME MINISTER FURTHER STRENGTHENED HER POSITION LATE IN THE YEAR BY GINGERLY SEEKING SUPPORT OUTSIDE THE CONGRESS. SHE REACHED A LIMITED ELECTORAL UNDERSTANDING WITH CONGRESS-O STALWART K. KAMARAJ IN TAMIL NADU AND MADE HIS PARTY SUSPECT IN THE EYES OF POSSIBLE OPPOSITION COALITION PARTNERS. THE ENTENTE WITH THE CPI WAS STRENGTHENED BY THE BREZHNEV VISIT, ALTHOUGH THE CPI ITSELF WAS EMBARRASSED BY THE SOVIET LEADER'S PRAISE FOR

THE CONGRESS. THUS, THE PRIME MINISTER KEPT OPPONENTS ON THE RIGHT AND LEFT DIVIDED. KASHMIR'S SHEIKH ABDULLAH ANNOUNCED HIS DESIRE TO PURSUE HIS SECULAR COURSE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL; WITHOUT JOINING THE CONGRESS, HE HAS PROVED USEFUL TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN OPPOSING MUSLIM COMMUNAL GROUPS. FINALLY, THE PRIME MINISTER STATE-MANAG G A RETURN TO "POPULAR GOVERNMENT" IN UTTAR PRADESH AND ANDHRA AND ACQUIESCED IN THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD IN RAJASTHAN. IN ALL THREE STATES, SHE AGREED TO THE SELECTION OF STRONG, ABLE LEADERS WHOSE LOCAL CLOUT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 NEW DE 00182 02 OF 02 050425Z

OUTWEIGHED DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR COMPLETE LOYALTY TO HER. THE CUMBERSOME SIX-POINT FORMULA TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF ANDHRA SATISFIES NO ONE AND VIRTUALLY RULES OUT A PROCESS OF TRUE INTEGRATION THERE. BY YEAR-END THE PRIME MINISTER COULD SEE FAIRLY CLEAR, IF NOT EASY, POLITICAL SAILING AHEAD. CONGRESS PROSPECTS IN UTTAR PRADESH LOOKED GOOD; ENERGETIC CHIEF MINISTER BAHUGUNA CLEARLY HAS A BLANK CHECK TO DRAW FROM NEW DELHI WHATEVER RESOURCES ARE NEEDED TO WIN THE FEBRUARY ELECTIONS. IN ORISSA THE CONGRESS MAY WELL LOSE, BUT IT HAS WON THERE ONLY ONCE ANYWAY. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN AUGUST 1974 SHOULD PROVE MANAGEABLE. ON THE POLITICAL HORIZON, THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF A NEW CRISIS SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH SPLIT THE CONGRESS DURING THE 1969 PRESIDENTIAL POLL.

7. DESPITE HER POLITICAL RECOVERY, 1973 REVEALED THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS FACING THE PRIME MINISTER AND HER WEAKNESSES IN MEETING THEM. INFLATION ERODED THE CONFIDENCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES AND THE FAITH OF THE MASSES. SCARCITIES AND BOTTLENECKS DISCOURAGED THE MANUFACTURER, THE INVESTOR, AND PLAGUED THE COMMON VOTER. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION REMAINED STAGNANT. CORRUPTION AND ADULTERATION OF CONSUMER GOODS APPEARED TO BE MORE WIDELY SPREAD THROUGH THE ECONOMY. THE BURGEONING UNIVERSITIES TURNED OUT EVER MORE ILL-EDUCATED GRADUATES FOR WHOM THERE ARE NO JOBS. THE FIFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN PROJECTIONS WERE WIDELY SEEN AS UNREALISTIC. THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT SOLELY ECONOMIC; EVEN IF THE BEST POLICIES COULD BE FOUND, EFFECTIVE TOP-LEVEL POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERS TO IMPLEMENT THEM ARE SCARCE. AT ALL LEVELS, NEITHER THE BUREAUCRACY NOR THE POLITICAL APPARATUS IS MOTIVATED OR PERHAPS EVEN ABLE TO EFFECT MUCH-NEEDED REFORMS. OVER THE LONGER TERM, OF COURSE, HANGS THE MALTHUSIAN SHADOW OF MORE MOUTHS AND LESS FOOD.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER'S DECISIVENESS IS ESSENTIALLY IN

THE AREA OF POLITICS, NOT ECONOMICS OR SOCIAL RESURM.
SHE HOPES FOR THE BEST, HOLDS OUT PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVE-
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 NEW DE 00182 02 OF 02 050425Z

MENT EVEN WHEN WHE ALMOST CERTAINLY KNOWS THESE EX-
PECTATIONS WILL FAIL (AS WITH THE TARGETS FOR THE FIFTH
FIVE YEAR PLAN), AND URGES SELF-SACRIFICE AND COMMON
EFFORT (AS IN HER CALL FOR A MORATORIUM ON STRIKES) WHEN
CYNICISM AND AN ATMOSPHERE OF "SAUVE QUI PEUT" IS ON
THE RISE VIRTUALLY EVERYWHERE. BUT HER TACTICS ARE TO
PUT OFF CRISES FROM TODAY TO SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE.
SHE IS A MASTERFUL POLITICIAN AND THERE IS LITTLE PROS-
PECT FOR ANY REAL NATIONAL CHALLENGE TO HER POLITICAL
POWER IN THE NEXT YEAR. BUT THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT
EITHER OF MUCH REAL PROGRESS FOR INDIA.

9. IT'S A LARGE COUNTRY AND THE SITUATION LOOKS BETTER
OR WORSE IN DIFFERENT PLACES. MANY LOCAL POLITICAL
LEADERS ARGUE THAT, WITH MORE EMPHASIS ON LOCAL ENERGY

AND WITH MORE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE STATES, AT LEAST
THEIR REGIONS CAN MOVE AHEAD AND SOLVE KEY PROBLEMS.
THE CENTER IS LESS CONFIDENT OF THIS AND REFUSES TO RELAX
ITS CONTROLS AND AUTHORITY ANY MORE THAN IS ABSOLUTELY
NECESSARY. MRS. GANDHI DOES NOT SEE THAT ULTIMATE
NECESSITY AS BEING UPON HER--YET. BUT SHE IS WALKING A
THIN EDGE AND CONTINUATION OF THE STAGFLATION AND DETERI-
ORATING SENSE OF ACHIEVEMENT IN THE COUNTRY WOULD
GRADUALLY BEGIN AGAIN TO UNDERMINE HER POSITION PIECE
BY PIECE IN THE STATES.

10. ALL THIS PAINTS INDIA AS A PORTRAIT IN GREYS,
PERHAPS AS WHISTLER WOULD HAVE DONE MRS. GANDHI. IT IS
SOBLL MYRDAL'S "SOFT STATE" WHERE CHANGE IS ALMOST
IMPERCEPTIBLE AND POLITICS AFFECT FEW PEOPLE EXCEPT IN
HIGHLY EMOTIONAL CONTEXTS--RELIGIOUS, CASTE, NATIONAL
HONOR--OR UNDER GRAVE ECONOMIC PRESSURE. THE ECONOMIC
PRESSURE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THERE, BUT THE PASSAGE OF TIME,
A GROWING POPULATION, AND WHAT APPEARS A GRADUAL POLITICAL
DEMORALIZATION MAKE IT APPEAR TO BE INTENSIFYING. IF
SHE CAN AVOID CRISES, OTHER THAN THOSE SHE INTENTIONALLY
MAKES OR CONTROLS, MRS. GANDHI WILL DRIFT ALONG AND SO
WILL INDIA FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS. ANYTHING WHICH
THREATENS MRS. GANDHI'S POWER IS SEEN BY HER AS
THREATENING INDIA. HER RESPONSE TO FOREIGN RELATIONS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 NEW DE 00182 02 OF 02 050425Z

IS VERY MUCH A PART OF HOW SHE SEES THE ACTIVITIES OF

FOREIGN STATES AS AFFECTING HER OWN POWER POSITION IN INDIA. WHILE SHE IS POLITICALLY STRONG AND IN CONTROL, SHE IS ABLE AND WILLING TO DEAL AND WORK WITH ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. HER ARGUMENT FOR WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE SOVIETS IS THAT THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED INDIA (AND HER) AND HAVE NOT ASKED FOR MUCH IN RETURN. IF HER POSITION WERE TO WEAKEN, SHE IS VERY LIKELY TO TURN ON ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHE MAY BELIEVE (OR BE ABLE TO MAKE A PUBLIC CASE FOR BELIEVING) HAS AN INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF HER OPPONENTS. AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES, THIS MAKES FOR A CURRENTLY IMPROVING BUT POTENTIALLY FRAGILE BASIS FOR GOOD INDO-US RELATIONS. ALL THIS UNDERLINES THE FACT THAT INDIA IS A POLITICALLY WEAK STATE EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY THE STRONGEST IN THE REGION.
MOYNIHAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, INFLATION, ELECTIONS, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, CIVIL DISORDERS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 JAN 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974NEWDE00182
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NEW DELHI
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740174/abbrzbcw.tel
Line Count: 343
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <04 JUN 2002 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: 1973 INDIAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REVIEW
TAGS: PINT, IN
To: STATE INFO BOMBAY
CALCUTTA
MADRAS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005